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Nicholas	Barr	&	Howard	Glennerster	|	Life	after
COVID-19:	start	planning	now
COVID-19	has	exposed	Britain’s	failure	to	plan	for	both	a	pandemic	and	a	growing	elderly	population,	write
Nicholas	Barr	and	Howard	Glennerster	(LSE).	Splitting	the	budget	for	care	between	hospitals,	social	care	and
GPs	has	given	each	an	incentive	to	pass	on	costs	to	each	other,	rather	than	trying	to	prevent	problems	developing
in	the	first	place.
The	pandemic	is	a	stress	test	for	public	policy	in	all	countries.	However,	even	allowing	for	variation	in	population
density,	age	structure	and	so	on,	the	differences	in	death	rates	are	vast,	from	under	five	deaths	per	million	in
Australia	and	New	Zealand	to	over	500	in	the	UK.
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It	is	right	that	public	policy	has	concentrated	on	urgent	tasks,	but	the	immediate	should	not	wholly	crowd	out	the
long	run.	Planning	for	the	British	welfare	state	took	place	at	the	height	of	the	second	world	war,	so	coherent	action
could	follow	as	soon	as	the	war	ended.	In	that	spirit,	of	many	possible	lessons	for	the	UK	government,	we	stress
three	–	gallingly,	none	of	them	new.
Lesson	1:	Uncertainty	requires	resilience
Next	year	is	the	centenary	of	Risk,	Uncertainty,	and	Profit	by	Frank	Knight,	which	made	the	fundamental	distinction
between	risk	and	uncertainty.	With	risk,	the	probability	of	an	event	(e.g.	breaking	a	leg)	is	fairly	well	known;	with
uncertainty	it	is	not	(Andrew	Haldane	provides	a	modern	summary).
Uncertainty	is	very	present:	Covid-19	is	the	fourth	pandemic	this	century	(SARS,	swine	flu,	Ebola),	with	further
outbreaks	plausible.
The	strategic	principle	for	addressing	uncertainty	is	resilience.	‘Just	in	time’	works	in	a	situation	of	certainty,	and
where	the	costs	of	delay	are	small.	But	for	areas	like	healthcare,	a	narrow	accounting	focus	on	short-term	cost
efficiency	–	e.g.	the	proud	boast	of	98%	NHS	bed	usage	–	leads	to	false	economy.
Resilience	has	at	least	two	elements.	First,	is	an	adaptable	plan,	well-rehearsed	and	understood	by	the	people	on
the	ground	who	will	carry	it	out.	The	lack	of	a	plan	to	address	Hurricane	Katrina	in	2005	was	obvious.	The	UK’s	lack
of	preparedness	for	this	pandemic	is	shameful.	Divers	have	a	saying,	‘Plan	the	dive.	Dive	the	plan’.	The	countries
that	did	best	in	addressing	the	pandemic	complied	with	both	elements	of	that	mandate;	we	did	neither.
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Second	is	spare	capacity.
‘Designing	robust	systems	requires	building	some	redundancy	and	slack	into	them,	at	the	expense	of
some	efficiency	in	the	short	term.	But	if	…	the	tail	risks	materialize,	the	more	robust	systems	will	prove	to
have	been	more	efficient	from	a	long-run	perspective’	(Derviş	2020).
Sufficient	capacity	to	cover	a	wide	range	of	uncertain	outcomes	means	that	there	will	be	some	spare	capacity	(a
better	term	than	excess	capacity)	in	‘normal’	times.	Nobody	should	pretend	that	optimising	in	the	face	of	uncertainty
is	easy,	but	being	approximately	right	by	trying	to	do	so	is	better	than	being	exactly	wrong	by	trying	to	minimise
short-run	cost.
Lesson	2:	An	international	systemic	shock	requires	an	international
response
Uncertainty	is	not	the	only	problem.	The	effects	of	the	pandemic	are	not	localised	like	a	fire	that	burns	down	a	few
buildings,	but	a	systemic	shock	(sometimes	called	a	common	shock)	that	affects	pretty	much	everything	and
everywhere.	That	is	the	new	lesson	to	add	to	Knight’s	original	insight.
Private	markets	alone	cannot	address	the	twin	problems	of	uncertainty	and	systemic	shock:	if	the	probability	is	not
known,	insurers	cannot	price	policies	accurately;	and	since	common	shocks	mean	that	most	people	are	losers,	the
insurer	cannot	use	the	premiums	of	those	who	have	not	lost	to	compensate	those	who	have.
Thus	it	is	not	possible	to	address	the	problem	by	sharing	risk,	but	only	by	eliminating	it	–	through	a	vaccine.
However:
‘Usually	…,	firms	invest	in	large-scale	capacity	only	after	the	vaccine	has	proved	effective.	But	in	the
middle	of	a	pandemic,	there	are	huge	social	and	economic	advantages	to	having	vaccines	ready	to	use
as	soon	as	they	have	been	approved.	If	we	leave	it	entirely	to	the	market,	we	will	get	too	little	vaccine
too	late’	(New	York	Times,	4	May	2020).
In	sum,	what	we	are	up	against	is	systemic	uncertainty,	which	only	the	state	or	–	better	–	a	partnership	of	states,
has	the	capacity	to	address.
Lesson	3:	Don’t	ignore	the	past	–	it	will	rear	up	and	bite	you
There	were	peaks	in	the	birth	rate	in	the	late	1940s	and	mid-1960s.	We	have	known	about	the	baby	boom	for	more
than	half	a	century,	and	about	longer	life	spans	for	at	least	as	long.	Yet	successive	governments	have	consistently
put	off	responding.	What	is	needed	are	more	resources,	and	better	use	of	them.
More	resources
People	in	their	80s	put	much	heavier	demands	on	the	NHS	and	social	care	than	those	in	their	40s.	They	have
multiple	and	long-term	conditions,	technical	advances	cost	more,	and	productivity	gains	are	more	difficult	to	achieve
in	such	services.	The	American	economist	William	Baumol	drew	attention	to	that	phenomenon	in	the	1960s	and	it
has	been	elaborated	on	many	times	since	(Economist,	29	September	2012).
We	have	been	slow	to	increase	the	scale	of	resources,	and	even	more	reluctant	to	redesign	the	patchwork	of
elderly	care	services	that	emerged	after	the	second	world	war.	A	new	NHS	was	born,	but	alongside	it	were	services
essentially	patterned	on	the	19th	century	Poor	Law,	locally	funded	and	means-tested.	Residential	care	was	largely
privatised	in	the	1980s	and,	whatever	the	virtues	of	that	move,	left	thousands	of	small	independent	enterprises	ill-
prepared	for	a	collective	catastrophe.	It	has	long	been	agreed	by	all	parties	that	social	care	needs	more	resources,
but	the	proposals	of	the	2011	Dilnot	Report	were	postponed	–	though	at	the	time	of	writing	are	perhaps	moving
towards	the	front	burner.
Better	co-ordinated	resources
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The	effective	care	of	elderly	people	requires	close	interaction	between	divergent	services.	The	present
arrangements	have	four	disparate	funding	streams:
Hospitals:	funding	from	central	government	broadly	follows	patient	numbers,	with	a	tariff	for	each	admitted	patient,
given	the	diagnosis.
Social	care,	where	funding	is	divided	into	two	streams:
a)	Local	government,	where	funding	cuts	have	meant	that	resources	are	concentrated	on	high-need	cases	not	on
early	prevention.
b)	Individuals,	who	pay	for	their	own	care	on	a	means-tested	basis	if	they	receive	local	authority	services,	or	in	full
for	private	care.
GPs	are	funded	largely	on	the	basis	of	capitation	payments	from	central	government	weighted	by	age	and
deprivation.
These	arrangements	inevitably	produce	incentives	to	shift	costs	onto	other	agencies	and	not	to	engage	in	activities
which	would	mainly	benefit	another	agency.	The	consequences	of	such	a	perverse	pattern	have	been	clear	since
the	work	of	the	Guillebaud	Committee	in	1956!
There	is	no	incentive	for	local	authorities	or	private	residential	care	home	to	take	people	out	of	hospital	until	they
are	sure	they	will	not	present	costly	problems.
There	is	no	incentive	for	local	authorities	and	GPs	to	move	funds	from	those	in	acute	need	to	preventative	work
that	will	reduce	demands	on	hospitals	years	down	the	line.
Residential	care	homes	understandably	send	residents	to	accident	and	emergency	rather	than	face	costly	risks
themselves.
Many	schemes	have	been	introduced	to	try	to	mitigate	these	basic	problems	–	for	example,	paying	local	authorities
to	facilitate	hospital	discharge.	But,	as	forcibly	described	in	a	House	of	Lords	report	(Annex	12),	separate	budgets
and	funding	arrangements	make	co-ordinated	action	hard	work.
The	virus	has	highlighted	the	imperative	to	repair	these	long-term	cracks.	The	time	to	start	planning	is	now.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.
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